THE DOCUMENT COMPANY

XEROX®

Xerox WorkCentre M35/M45/M55
and
WorkCentre Pro 35/45/55
Advanced Multifunction System with
Image Overwrite Security

Security Target

Version 1.0

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July 19, 2004	1.1	Original Draft
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September 1, 2004	1.4	Minor grammatical errors corrected

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1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION

This Chapter presents security target (ST) identification information and an overview of the ST. An ST contains the information technology (IT) security requirements of an identified Target of Evaluation (TOE) and specifies the functional and assurance security measures offered by that TOE to meet stated requirements. An ST principally defines:

a) A security problem expressed as a set of assumptions about the security aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product is intended to counter, and any known rules with which the product must comply (Chapter 3, TOE Security Environment).

b) A set of security objectives and a set of security requirements to address the security problem (Chapters 4 and 5, Security Objectives and IT Security Requirements, respectively).

c) The IT security functions provided by the TOE that meet the set of requirements (Chapter 6, TOE Summary Specification).

The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex C, and Part 3, Chapter 5.

1.1 ST and TOE Identification

This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its Target of Evaluation (TOE). This ST targets Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL)2.

ST Title:	Xerox WorkCentre M35/M45/M55 and WorkCentre Pro 35/45/55 Advanced Multifunction System Security Target with Image Overwrite Security
ST Version:	1.0
Revision Number:	$Revision: 1.4 $
Publication Date:	$Date: 2004/09/01 13:19:24 $
Authors:	Computer Sciences Corporation, Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
TOE Identification:	Xerox WorkCentre M35/M45/M55 / WorkCentre Pro 35/45/55 Advanced Multifunction System with Image Overwrite Security.
CC Identification:	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.1, August 1999 (also known as ISO 15408)
ST Evaluator:	Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC)
Keywords:	Xerox, Multi Function Device, Image Overwrite

1.2 References

The following documentation was used to prepare this ST:

[CC_PART1]   Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation –
Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated August 1999, version
2.1, CCIMB-99-031, Incorporated with interpretations as of 2002-02-
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[CC_PART2]   Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation –
Part 2: Security functional requirements, dated August 1999, version
2.1, CCIMB-99-032 , Incorporated with interpretations as of 2002-02-
28.

[CC_PART3]   Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation –
Part 3: Security assurance requirements, dated August 1999, version
2.1, CCIMB-99-033, Incorporated with interpretations as of 2002-02-
28.

[CEM_PART1]   Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology
Security – Part 1: Introduction and General Model, dated 1 November
1997, version 0.6.

[CEM_PART2]   Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation – Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, dated August 1999,
version 1.0.

1.3 Conventions, Terminology, and Acronyms

This section identifies the formatting conventions used to convey additional information and terminology. It also defines terminology and the meanings of acronyms used throughout this ST.

1.3.1 Conventions

This section describes the conventions used to denote Common Criteria (CC) operations on security functional components and to distinguish text with special meaning. The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this ST are largely consistent with those used in the CC. Selected presentation choices are discussed here.

The CC allows several operations to be performed on security functional components; *assignment, refinement*, *selection,* and *iteration* as defined in paragraph 2.1.4 of Part 2 of the CC are:

a) The *assignment* operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets [assignment_value(s)] indicates an assignment.

b) The *refinement* operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by **bold text**.

c) The *selection* operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement. Selections are denoted by *underlined italicized text.*

d) *Iterated* functional components are given unique identifiers by appending to the component name, short name, and functional element name from the CC an iteration number inside parenthesis, i.e., FMT_MTD.1.1 (1) and FMT_MTD.1.1 (2).

e) Plain *italicized text* is used to emphasize text.

1.3.2 Terminology

In the CC, many terms are defined in Section 2.3 of Part 1. The following terms are a subset of those definitions:

Authentication data	Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
Authorized User	A user who may, in accordance with the TOE Security Policy (TSP[1]), perform an operation.
External IT entity	Any IT product or system, untrusted or trusted, outside of the TOE that interacts with the TOE.
Human user	Any person who interacts with the TOE.
Identity	A representation (e.g., a string) uniquely identifying an authorized user, which can either be the full or abbreviated name of that user or a pseudonym.
Object	An entity within the TOE Security Function (TSF[2]) Scope of Control (TSC[3]) that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.
Role	A predefined set of rules establishing the allowed interactions between a user and the TOE.
Security Functional Components	Express security requirements intended to counter threats in the assumed operating environment of the TOE.
Subject	An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
User	Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.

The following terminology is specific to this ST.

Image Data	Information on a mass storage device created by the copy/print/scan/FAX/email process.

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1 TSP – A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE.
As defined in the CC, Part 1, version 2.1:
2 TSF - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
3 TSC - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.

| *Latent Image Data* | Residual information remaining on a mass storage device when a copy/print/scan/FAX/email job is completed, cancelled, or interrupted. |
| *System Administrator* | An authorized user who manages the Xerox Corporation WorkCentre/WorkCentre Pro. |

1.3.3 Acronyms

The following acronyms are used in this Security Target:

ACRONYM	DEFINITION
AUT	Authentication
CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CM	Configuration Management
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
FDP	User Data Protection CC Class
FIA	Identification and Authentication CC Class
FMT	Security Management CC Class
FPT	Protection of Security Functions
FSP	Functional Specification
HDD	Hard Disk Drive
HLD	High Level Design
ISO	International Standards Organization
ISO 15408	Common Criteria 2.1 ISO Standard
IT	Information Technology
MOF	Management of Functions
MTD	Management of TSF Data
OSP	Organization Security Policy
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SIP	Scanner Image Processor
SM	Security Management
SMR	Security Management Roles
SOF	Strength of Function
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TSF Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Function
TSP	TOE Security Policy

ACRONYM	DEFINITION
UAU	User Authentication
UDP	User Data Protection

1.4   TOE Overview

The TOE is a multi-function device (copy & print), with scan to e-mail, network scan and FAX, options (hereafter referred to as a MFD). An additional optional component is the Image Overwrite Security package. This option forces any temporary image files created during a print, network scan, or scan to email job to be overwritten when those files are no longer needed or "on demand" by the system administrator.

A summary of the TOE security functions can be found in Section 2, TOE Description. A detailed description of the security functions can be found in Section 6, TOE Summary Specification.

1.5   Common Criteria Conformance Claim

This ST conforms to CC Part 2 extended, and is CC Part 3 conformant at the EAL 2 level of assurance.

2   TOE DESCRIPTION

This section provides context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the product type and describing the evaluated configuration.

2.1   Product Type

The TOE is a multi-function device that copies and prints, with scan to e-mail, network scan and FAX, options (hereafter referred to as a MFD). An additional optional component is the Image Overwrite Security package. This option forces any temporary image files created during a print, network scan, or scan to email job to be overwritten when those files are no longer needed.

Table 1: Models and capabilities

	Print	Copy[1]	Network Scan	FAX[1]	Scan 2 email
WorkCentre M35	x	x	n/a	o	o
WorkCentre M45	x	x	n/a	o	o
WorkCentre M55	x	x	n/a	o	o
WorkCentre Pro 35	x	x	o	o	o
WorkCentre Pro 45	x	x	o	o	o
WorkCentre Pro 55	x	x	o	o	o
[1] Copy and FAX jobs are not spooled to the HDD.					

A MFD stores temporary image data created during a print, network scan or scan to email job on an internal hard disk drive (HDD). This temporary image data consists of the original data submitted and additional files created during a job. Copy and FAX jobs do not get written to the HDD.

The TOE provides an IMAGE_OVERWRITE (TSF_IOW) function to enhance the security of the MFD. The IMAGE_OVERWRITE function overwrites temporary document image data as described in DoD Standard 5200.28-M at the completion of each print, network scan, or scan to email job or *on demand* of the MFD system administrator. A system administrator may use the "on demand" image overwrite security option to clear sensitive information from the HDD when the MFD is decommissioned, for example.

2.1.1 Physical Scope and Boundary

The TOE is a Multi-Function Device that consists of a printer, copier, scanner, FAX, and email as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Xerox WorkCentre/WorkCentre Pro 35/45/55

The figure shows an optional paper feeder and finisher.

Table 2: Evaluated Software/Firmware version

Software/Firmware Item	WorkCentre M35/M45/M55	WorkCentre M35/M45/M55 + PostScript	WorkCentre Pro 35/45/55
System Software	2.097.20.000	4097.20.000	3. 097.20.000
Network Controller Software	1.02.166.01	1.02.266.01	1.02.366.01
UI Software	002.92.012	002.92.012	002.92.012
SIP Software	10.95.01	10.95.01	10.95.01
IOT Software	23.35.00	23.35.00	23.35.00
DADH Software	12.15.00	12.15.00	12.15.00
Finisher Software	09.15.00	09.15.00	09.15.00
FAX Software	00.96.22	00.96.22	00.96.22

2.1.2 Logical Scope and Boundary

The logical scope of the evaluation includes the underlying operation system (LynxOS) and the various applications and processes that use the embedded operation system. The TOE logical boundary is the following security functions controlled by the TOE:

- Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW)
- Authentication (TSF_AUT)
- Security Management (TSF_FMT)

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- Data Flow Security (TSF_FLOW)

2.1.3 Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW)

The TOE implements an image overwrite security function to overwrite temporary files created during the printing, network scan, or scan to email process. The network controller spools and processes documents to be printed or scanned. Temporary files are created as a result of this processing on a reserved section of the hard disk drive. Once the job has completed, the files are overwritten using a three pass overwrite procedure as described in DOD 5800.28-M (Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO) and "On-Demand" Image Overwrite (ODIO)). The TSF_IOW function can also be invoked manually by the system administrator (ODIO).

The ODIO is invoked by the System Administrator via the tools menu/web interface. Once invoked, the ODIO cancels all print and scan jobs, halts the printer interface (network), overwrites the contents of the reserved section on the hard disk, and then the network controller reboots. If the System Administrator attempts to activate diagnostics mode while ODIO is in progress, the request will be queued until the ODIO completes and then the system will enter diagnostic mode.

2.1.4 Information Flow (TSF_FLOW)

The TOE is architected to provide separation between the optional FAX processing board and the network controller.

The FAX card plugs directly into the PCI bus of the SIP (Scanner Image Processor) board with the SIP acting as the PCI bus master. The SIP communicates with the network controller via the industry standard FireWire interface, but it is the SIP/FAX interface that provides TSF_FLOW

There are two methods of communication between the SIP and the FAX - Command/Response and Image data transfer. Commands and Responses are sent and received via a shared memory block on the FAX card. Image data is transferred using DMA transfer with the SIP acting as the bus master. For outgoing fax the SIP will push image data to the FAX card. For incoming fax the SIP will pull image data from the FAX. The FAX card will inform the SIP when there is a FAX available for collection. Similarly, the SIP will inform the FAX card when it wishes to send a fax out.

2.1.5 Authentication (TSF_AUT)

The TOE utilizes a simple authentication function through the front panel or web interface. The system administrator must authenticate by entering an 3 to 12 digit PIN prior to being granted access to the tools menu and system administration functions. The system administrator must change the default PIN after installation is complete. While the system administrator is entering the PIN number, the TOE displays a '*' character for each digit entered to hide the value entered.

The Web user interface also requires the user to enter a PIN and enter "admin" into the username field. The username prompt provided by the web server is not used, but is provided for historical

reasons. The only valid string is "admin", which is hard coded into the web server and cannot be changed. Additional users cannot be added. The TOE does not associate user attributes or privileges based on username.

2.1.6 Security Management (TSF_FMT)

The TSF_FMT utilizes the front panel software module security mechanisms to allow only authenticated system administrators the capability to enable or disable the TSF_IOW function, change the system administrator PIN, abort ODIO, or manually invoke "On Demand" Image Overwrite.

The TOE restricts access to the configuration of administrative functions to the system administrator.

3   TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

3.1   Secure Usage Assumptions

This section describes the security aspects of the intended environment for the evaluated TOE. This includes information about the physical, personnel, procedural, connectivity, and functional aspects of the environment.

The operational environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirement documentation for delivery, operation, and user/system administrator guidance. The following specific conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where this TOE is employed.

3.1.1 Environment Assumptions

The environmental assumptions delineated in Table 3 are required to ensure the security of the TOE:

Table 3: Environmental Assumptions

Assumption	Description
A.INSTALL	The TOE has been delivered, installed, and setup in accordance with documented delivery and installation/setup procedures.
A.MANAGE	There will be one or more competent system administrator(s) assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains.
A.NO_EVIL_ADM	The system administrator(s) are not careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the system administration documentation.
A.PROCEDURE	Procedures exist for granting system administrator(s) access to the TSF.
A.CHANGE_KOC	System administrators PIN is changed according to the following: 8-digit PIN every 40 days 9-digit PIN every year

3.2   Threats

Table 4 identifies the threats to the TOE. The threats to the TOE are considered to be users with public knowledge of how the TOE operates. However, the threats do not possess access to the resources necessary to recover latent residual information from a HDD. The threat has access to the TOE. Mitigation to the threats is through the objectives identified in Section 4, Security Objectives.

Table 4: Threats to the TOE

Threat	Description
T.RECOVER	A malicious user may attempt to recover temporary document image data from a print/network scan/email job by removing the HDD and using commercially available tools to read its contents. This scenario may occur as part the life-cycle of the MFD (e.g. decommission) or as a more overt action.
T.FAXLINE	A malicious user may attempt to access the internal network (to access data and/or resources) via the FAX telephone line/modem using publicly available tools and equipment (the threat agent does not have access to specialized digital/analog telephone/modem/computer/etc. equipment).

3.3   Organizational Security Policies

There are no organizational security policies that are determined to be relevant for the TOE.

4   SECURITY OBJECTIVES

The purpose of the security objectives is to detail the planned response to a security problem or threat. Threats can be directed against the TOE or the security environment or both, therefore, the CC identifies two categories of security objectives:

- Security objectives for the TOE, and

- Security objectives for the environment.

4.1   Security Objectives for the TOE

This section identifies and describes the security objectives of the TOE.

The TOE accomplishes the security objectives defined in Table 5.

Table 5: Security Objectives for the TOE

Objectives	Description
O.RESIDUAL	Temporary document image data from a job must not remain on the hard disk drive once that job is completed.
O.MANAGE	Only System Administrators shall have the capability to exercise security management functions provided by the TSF.
O.RESTRICT	The TOE will restrict access to the network from the telephone line via the TOE's FAX modem.
O.ONDEMAND	The TOE will provide the system administrator with the ability to invoke the image overwrite function "on demand."

4.2   Security Objectives for the Environment

4.2.1   Security objectives for the IT Environment

There are no dependencies on any hardware or software that is not included in the TOE.

4.2.2   Security objectives for the non IT Environment

The security objectives for the non-IT Environment are defined in Table 6.

Table 6: Security Objectives for the TOE Environment

Objectives	Description
OE.MANAGE	A responsible individual will be assigned as the system administrator who will see that the TOE is installed, and is operated in accordance with all applicable policies and procedures necessary to operate the

Objectives	Description
	TOE in a secure manner.

5   IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This section defines the IT security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE or its environment:

The CC divides TOE security requirements into two categories:

- Security functional requirements (SFRs) (such as, identification and authentication, security management, and user data protection) that the TOE and the supporting evidence need to satisfy to meet the security objectives of the TOE.

- Security assurance requirements (SARs) that provide grounds for confidence that the TOE and its supporting IT environment meet its security objectives (e.g., configuration management, testing, and vulnerability assessment).

These requirements are discussed separately within the following subsections.

5.1   TOE Security Functional Requirements

The TOE satisfies the SFRs delineated in Table 7. The rest of this section contains a description of each component and any related dependencies.

Table 7: TOE Security Functional Requirements

Functional Component ID	Functional Component Name
FDP_RIP.1	Subset Residual Information Protection
FIA_UID.2	User Identification before any Action
FIA_UAU.2	User Authentication before any Action
FIA_UAU.7	Protected Authentication Feedback
FMT_MOF.1	Management of Security Functions Behavior
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1	Security Roles

5.1.1 Class FDP: User Data Protection

FDP_RIP.1   Subset Residual Information Protection

   Hierarchical to: No other components

   FDP_RIP.1.1   The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the *deallocation of the resource from* the following objects: [

                          Hard Disk Drive].

Dependencies: No dependencies

5.1.2 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication

FIA_UID.2   User identification before any action

    Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1

        FIA_UID.2.1   The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

        Dependencies: No dependencies

FIA_UAU.2   User Authentication Before Any Action

        Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication

        FIA_UAU.2.1   The TSF shall require each **system administrator** to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that **system administrator**.

        Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification

FIA_UAU.7   Protected Authentication Feedback

        Hierarchical to: No other components

        FIA_UAU.7.1   The TSF shall provide only [obscured feedback] to the **system administrator** while the authentication is in progress.

        Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication

5.1.3 Class FMT: Security Management

FMT_MOF.1   Management of Security Functions Behavior

        Hierarchical to: No other components

        FMT_MOF.1.1   The TSF shall restrict the ability to *disable* and *enable* the functions [TSF_IOW] to [the system administrator].

        Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions

FMT_SMF.1   Specification of Management Functions

        Hierarchical to: No other components.

FMT_SMF.1.1   The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: [

Enable/disable Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO) [TSF_IOW],

Change PIN,
Invoke/Abort ODIO [TSF_IOW]

Dependencies: No Dependencies

FMT_SMR.1   Security roles

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FMT_SMR.1.1   The TSF shall maintain the roles [system administrator].

FMT_SMR.1.2   The TSF shall be able to associate **human** users with roles.

Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

5.2   TOE Security Assurance Requirements

Table 8 identifies the security assurance components drawn from CC Part 3 Security Assurance Requirements EAL2. The SARs are not iterated or refined from Part 3.

Table 8: EAL2 Assurance Requirements

Assurance Component ID	Assurance Component Name	Dependencies
ACM_CAP.2	Configuration items	None
ADO_DEL.1	Delivery procedures	None
ADO_IGS.1	Installation, generation, and start-up procedures	AGD_ADM.1
ADV_FSP.1	Informal functional specification	ADV_RCR.1
ADV_HLD.1	Descriptive high-level design	ADV_FSP.1, ADV_RCR.1
ADV_RCR.1	Informal correspondence demonstration	None
AGD_ADM.1	Administrator guidance	ADV_FSP.1
AGD_USR.1	User guidance	ADV_FSP.1
ATE_COV.1	Evidence of coverage	ADV_FSP.1, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing	None
ATE_IND.2	Independent testing-sample	ADV_FSP.1, AGD_ADM.1, AGD_USR.1, ATE_FUN.1
AVA_SOF.1	Strength of TOE security function evaluation	ADV_FSP.1, ADV_HLD.1
AVA_VLA.1	Developer vulnerability analysis	ADV_FSP.1, ADV_HLD.1 AGD_ADM.1, AGD_USR.1

5.3 Security Requirements for the IT Environment

There are no security functional requirements for the IT Environment.

5.4 Explicitly Stated Requirements for the TOE

EXP_FAX.1   Network FAX Separation

    Hierarchical to: No other components

    EXP_FAX.1.1   Access to the internal network through the FAX telephone line/modem interface shall be denied.

    Dependencies: No dependencies

5.5 SFRs With SOF Declarations

The overall Strength of Function (SOF) claim for the TOE is SOF-basic.

FIA_UAU.2: The authentication mechanism has a PIN space of $10^3 - 10^{12}$ (3 – 12 digit PIN). Through Xerox guidance, the recommended PIN size is 8 to 12 digits (PIN Space of 10^8 to 10^{12}).

6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

This section presents an overview of the security functions implemented by the TOE and the Assurance Measures applied to ensure their correct implementation.

6.1 TOE Security Functions

This section presents the security functions performed by the TOE to satisfy the identified SFRs in Section 5.1.1. Traceability to SFRs is also provided.

6.1.1 Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW)

The TOE implements an image overwrite security function to overwrite temporary files created during the printing, network scan, or scan to email process. The network controller spools and processes documents to be printed or scanned. Temporary files are created as a result of this processing on a reserved section of the hard disk drive. Once the job has completed, the files are overwritten using a three pass overwrite procedure as described in DOD 5800.28-M (Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO) and "On-Demand" Image Overwrite (ODIO)). The TSF_IOW function can also be invoked manually by the system administrator (ODIO).

The ODIO is invoked by the System Administrator via the tools menu/web interface. Once invoked, the ODIO cancels all print and scan jobs, halts the printer interface (network), overwrites the contents of the reserved section on the hard disk, and then the network controller reboots. If the System Administrator attempts to activate diagnostics mode while ODIO is in progress, the request will be queued until the ODIO completes and then the system will enter diagnostic mode.

While ODIO is running, the GUI will display a message stating that ODIO is in progress and a abort button. If the System Administrator cancels ODIO, the process stops at a sector boundary. As part of the cancellation, the file system is rebuilt (e.g. the directory is cleared and the i-nodes are initialized and the system then reboots). During every reboot the system goes through a file system check that verifies the integrity of the directory, and the partitions are remounted as logical partitions.

If the network controller crashes for any reason, it will re-boot. The progress of all jobs is tracked in a log in the network controller. During the re-boot process, the log is tracked and will overwrite all abnormally terminated jobs.

Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_RIP.1

6.1.2 Information Flow (TSF_FLOW)

The TOE is architected to provide separation between the optional FAX processing board and the network controller.

The FAX card plugs directly into the PCI bus of the SIP board with the SIP acting as the PCI bus master. The SIP communicates with the network controller via the industry standard FireWire interface, but it is the SIP/FAX interface that provides TSF_FLOW

There are two methods of communication between the SIP and the FAX - Command/Response and Image data transfer. Commands and Responses are sent and received via a shared memory block on the FAX card. Image data is transferred using DMA transfer with the SIP acting as the bus master. For outgoing fax the SIP will push image data to the FAX card. For incoming fax the SIP will pull image data from the FAX. The FAX card will inform the SIP when there is a FAX available for collection. Similarly, the SIP will inform the FAX card when it wishes to send a fax out.

No mechanism exists to transfer arbitrary (e.g. non-FAX) data between the SIP and FAX card.

Functional Requirements Satisfied: EXP_FAX.1

6.1.3 Authentication (TSF_AUT)

The TOE utilizes a simple authentication function through the front panel or web interface. The system administrator must authenticate by entering an 3 to 12 digit PIN prior to being granted access to the tools menu and system administration functions. The system administrator must change the default PIN after installation is complete. While the system administrator is entering the PIN number, the TOE displays a '*' character for each digit entered to hide the value entered. The authentication mechanism has a PIN space of 10^3 to 10^{12}.

The Web user interface also requires the user to enter a PIN and enter "admin" into the username field. The username prompt provided by the web server is not used, but is provided for historical reasons. The only valid string is "admin", which is hard coded into the web server and cannot be changed. Additional users cannot be added. The TOE does not associate user attributes or privileges based on username.

Functional Requirements Satisfied: FMT_SMR.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2

6.1.4 Security Management (TSF_FMT)

The TSF_FMT utilizes the front panel software module security mechanisms to allow only authenticated system administrators the capability to enable or disable the TSF_IOW function, change the system administrator PIN, abort ODIO, or manually invoke "On Demand" Image Overwrite.

Additionally, TSF_FMT utilizes the web server authentication mechanism to allow only authenticated system administrators the capability to manually invoke "On Demand" Image Overwrite through the web interface.

The TOE restricts access to the configuration of administrative functions to the system administrator.

Functional Requirements Satisfied: FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_SMF.1

6.2 Assurance Measures

The TOE satisfies CC EAL2 assurance requirements. This section identifies the Configuration Management, Delivery and Operation, Development, Guidance Documents, Testing, and Vulnerability Assessment Assurance Measures applied by Xerox to satisfy the CC EAL2 assurance requirements.

Assurance Component	How requirement will be met
ACM_CAP.2 Configuration Items	The vendor provided configuration management documents and a Configuration Item list.
ADO_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures	The vendor provided delivery procedures.
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, Generation and Startup procedures	The vendor provided secure installation, generation and start up procedures.
ADV_FSP.1 Informal function specification	The vendor provided an informal function specification.
ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive high-level design	The vendor provided a descriptive high-level design document.
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration	The informal correspondence demonstration is provided in the design documentation. ST to FSP in the FSP, FSP to HLD in the HLD.
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator Guidance	The vendor submitted a system administration manual.
AGD_USR.1 User Guidance	The vendor submitted a user guide.
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage	The analysis of test coverage was submitted in the evaluation evidence.
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing	The test evidence was submitted to the CCTL.
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample	The laboratory used development evidence submitted by the vendor along with functional testing evidence as a baseline for an independent test plan.
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of Function	The vendor submitted an analysis of the SOF for the PIN.
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis	The vendor submitted vulnerability analysis was confirmed. The laboratory conducted an independent vulnerability assessment by building on the vendor's. The laboratory conducted penetration testing.

7 PROTECTION PROFILE (PP) CLAIMS

The TOE does not claim conformance to a PP.

8   RATIONALE

This section demonstrates the completeness and consistency of this ST by providing justification for the following:

Traceability	The security objectives for the TOE and its environment are explained in terms of threats countered and assumptions met. The SFRs are explained in terms of objectives met by the requirement. The traceability is illustrated through matrices that map the following:

- security objectives to threats encountered
- environmental objectives to assumptions met

- SFRs to objectives met

Assurance Level	A justification is provided for selecting an EAL2 level of assurance for this ST.
SOF	A rationale is provided for the SOF level chosen for this ST.
Dependencies	A mapping is provided as evidence that all dependencies are met.

8.1   Security Objectives Rationale

This section demonstrates that all security objectives for the TOE are traced back to aspects of the identified threats to be countered and/or aspects of the organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.

Table 9: Security Objectives Rationale

Objective	Threat Organizational Security Policy Assumption	Rationale
O.RESIDUAL	T.RECOVER	O.RESIDUAL helps to counter the threat T.RECOVER by limiting the amount of time that temporary document image data is on the hard disk drive. By removing this temporary data, the window of opportunity is reduced to the time necessary to process the job. The TSF_IOW function overwrites any residual data as described in DoD 5200.28-M.
O.MANAGE	T.RECOVER	The O.MANAGE objective helps to counter the

Objective	Threat Organizational Security Policy Assumption	Rationale
		threat T.RECOVER by ensuring that the TOE is properly configured and operating in accordance with stated security guidance.
O.RESTRICT	T.FAXLINE	O.RESTRICT counters the threat T.FAXLINE because it ensures that it is not possible to access the network from the telephone line via the TOE's FAX modem.
O.ONDEMAND	T.RECOVER	O.ONDEMAND helps counter the threat T.RECOVER because by manually invoking the image overwrite function, the system administrator is able to minimize the opportunity an adversary has to access temporary document image data on the HDD from a print, scan to email or network scanning job. O.ONDEMAND also helps counter the threat T.RECOVER when the device is decommissioned or moved. By manually invoking the image overwrite function, the system administrator is able to sanitize the spool partition of the HDD before the device is taken out of service or transported to an insecure site.

Table 10: Security Objectives Rationale for the Non-IT Environment

Objective	Threat Organizational Security Policy Assumption	Rationale
OE.MANAGE	A.CHANGE_KOC A.INSTALL A.MANAGE A.NO_EVIL_ADM A.PROCEDURE	OE.MANAGE is met by A.CHANGE_KOC, A.INSTALL, A.MANAGE, A.NO_EVIL_ADM, A.PROCEDURE by providing a trustworthy and responsible person to oversee the installation, configuration and operation of the TOE.

8.2   Security Requirements Rationale

This section provides evidence that demonstrates that the security objectives for the TOE and the IT environment are satisfied by the security requirements.

These mappings demonstrate that all TOE security requirements can be traced back to one or more TOE security objective(s), and all TOE security objectives are supported by at least one security requirement.

8.2.1 Rationale For TOE Security Requirements

This section provides evidence demonstrating that the security objectives of the TOE are satisfied by the security requirements. The following paragraphs provide the security requirement to security objective mapping and a rationale to justify the mapping.

SFR	Rationale
FDP_RIP.1	Ensures that residual temporary document data does not remain on the mass storage device once the corresponding job has completed processing. This SFR traces back and meets O.RESIDUAL and O.ONDEMAND.
FIA_UID.2	Ensures that system administrators are authenticated before accessing the security functionality of the TOE. This SFR traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.MANAGE.
FIA_UAU.2	Ensures that system administrators are authenticated before accessing the security functionality of the TOE. This SFR traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.MANAGE.
FIA_UAU.7	Ensures that only obscured feedback generated by the authentication process is provided to system administrators before successful authentication. This SFR traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.MANAGE.
FMT_MOF.1	Ensures that only system administrators have the capability to enable, disable, or manually invoke the Security Mode SFR. This SFR traces back and aids in meeting the following objective: O.MANAGE.
FMT_SMF.1	Ensures that critical security management functions (i.e., enable/disable IIO, change system administrator PIN, and invoke/abort ODIO) are available on the TOE. This SFR traces back and aids in meeting the following objectives: O.MANAGE and O.ONDEMAND.
FMT_SMR.1	Ensures that the TOE maintains the system administrator role – a trusted individual who can administer the TOE. This SFR traces back and aids in meeting O.MANAGE and O.ONDEMAND.

SFR	Rationale
EXP_FAX.1	Network FAX separation protects TSF and its data from modification or tampering. O.RESTRICT is met by architectural design of the TOE to make it impossible for an external entity to access TSF data or the network through the telephone line/modem of the optional FAX.

Table 11: TOE SFR Mapping to Objectives

	O.RESIDUAL	O. RESTRICT	O.MANAGE	O.ONDEMAND
FDP_RIP.1	X			X
FIA_UAU.2			X	
FIA_UAU.7			X	
FMT_UID.2			X	
FMT_MOF.1			X	
FMT_SMF.1			X	X
FMT_SMR.1			X	X
EXP_FAX.1		X		

8.3   Rationale For Assurance Level

This ST has been developed for multi-function digital image processing products incorporating a Image Overwrite Security option. The TOE environment will be exposed to a low level of risk because the TOE sits in office space where it is under almost constant supervision. Agents cannot physically access the HDD or FAX without disassembling the TOE. Agents have no means of infiltrating the TOE with code to effect a change. As such, the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 is appropriate.

8.4   Rationale For TOE Summary Specification

This section demonstrates that the TSFs and Assurance Measures meet the SFRs.

The specified TSFs work together to satisfy the TOE SFRs. Table 12 provides a mapping of SFRs to the TSFs to show that each SFR is captured within a security function.

Table 12: Mapping of SFRs to Security Functions

SFR	Name	TSF	Name
FDP_RIP.1	Subset Residual Information Protection	TSF_IOW	Image Overwrite
FIA_UAU.2	User Authentication before any Action	TSF_AUT	Authentication
FIA_UAU.7	Protected Authentication Feedback	TSF_AUT	Authentication
FIA_UID.2	User identification before any action	TSF_AUT	Authentication
FMT_MOF.1	Management of Security Functions Behavior (1)	TSF_FMT	Security Management
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions	TSF_FMT	Security Management
FMT_SMR.1	Security Roles	TSF_FMT	Security Management
FMT_SMR.1	Security Roles	TSF_AUT	Authentication
EXP_FAX.1	Network FAX Separation	TSF_FLOW	Information Flow

8.4.1 TOE Assurance Requirements

Section 6.2 of this document identifies the Assurance Measures implemented by Xerox to satisfy the assurance requirements of EAL2 as delineated in the table in Annex B of the CC, Part 3. Table 13 maps the Assurance Requirements with the Assurance Measures as stated in Section 5.2.

Table 13: Assurance Measure Compliance Matrix

Assurance Measure	Configuration Management	Delivery and Operation	Development	Guidance	Test	Vulnerability Assessment
ACM_CAP.2	X					
ADO_DEL.1		X				
ADO_IGS.1		X				
ADV_FSP.1			X			
ADV_HLD.1			X			
ADV_RCR.1			X			
AGD_ADM.1				X		
AGD_USR.1				X		

Assurance Measure	Configuration Management	Delivery and Operation	Development	Guidance	Test	Vulnerability Assessment
ATE_COV.1					X	
ATE_FUN.1					X	
ATE_IND.2					X	
AVA_SOF.1						X
AVA_VLA.1						X

8.4.2 TOE SOF Claims

The overall TOE SOF claim is SOF-basic because this SOF is sufficient to resist the threats identified in Section 3.2. Section 8.1 provides evidence that demonstrates that TOE threats are countered by the TOE security objectives. Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 demonstrate that the security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment are satisfied by the security requirements. The SOF-basic claim for the TOE applies because the TOE protects against an unskilled attacker with no special tools from accessing the TOE. The claim of SOF-basic ensures that the Image Overwrite mechanism is resistant to a low attack potential because the residual information cannot be accessed by subjects without sophisticated data recovery tools.   Furthermore, the claim SOF-basic ensures that an unskilled attacker cannot access the internal network from the telephone FAX/modem.

8.5   Rationale For SFR and SAR Dependencies

Table 14 is a cross-reference of the functional components, their related dependencies, and whether the dependency was satisfied.

Table 14: SFR Dependencies Status

Functional Component ID	Functional Component Name	Dependency (ies)	Satisfied
FDP_RIP.1	Residual Information Protection	None	
FIA_UAU.2	User Authentication before any Action	FIA_UID.1	Yes
FIA_UAU.7	Protected Authentication Feedback	FIA_UAU.1	Yes
FIA_UID.2	User identification before any action	none	
FMT_MOF.1	Management of Security Functions Behavior	FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	Yes
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions	None	

Functional Component ID	Functional Component Name	Dependency (ies)	Satisfied
FMT_SMR.1	Security Roles	FIA_UID.1	Yes

SAR dependencies identified in the CC have been met by this ST as shown in Table 15.

Table 15: EAL2 SAR Dependencies Satisfied

Assurance Component ID	Assurance Component Name	Dependencies	Satisfied
ACM_CAP.2	Configuration items	None	NA
ADO_DEL.1	Delivery procedures	None	NA
ADO_IGS.1	Installation, generation, and start-up procedures	AGD_ADM.1	YES
ADV_FSP.1	Informal functional specification	ADV_RCR.1	YES
ADV_HLD.1	Descriptive high-level design	ADV_FSP.1, ADV_RCR.1	YES
ADV_RCR.1	Informal correspondence demonstration	None	YES
AGD_ADM.1	Administrator guidance	ADV_FSP.1	YES
AGD_USR.1	User guidance	ADV_FSP.1	YES
ATE_COV.1	Evidence of coverage	ADV_FSP.1, ATE_FUN.1	YES
ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing	None	NA
ATE_IND.2	Independent testing-sample	ADV_FSP.1, AGD_ADM.1, AGD_USR.1, ATE_FUN.1	YES
AVA_SOF.1	Strength of TOE security function evaluation	ADV_FSP.1, ADV_HLD.1	YES
AVA_VLA.1	Developer vulnerability analysis	ADV_FSP.1, ATE_HLD.1 AGD_ADM.1, AGD_USR.1	YES

8.6   Rationale for Explicitly Stated Requirements

The CC is geared toward operating systems, as such, FPT_SEP.1 does not fit the TOE's architecture. For this reason, it was necessary to write an explicitly stated requirement,

EXP_FAX.1, that states that the TSF will separate the network and FAX interfaces. This requirement is necessary to provide isolation between the FAX telephone line/modem and the network interface.

8.7   Internal Consistency and Mutually Supportive Rationale

The set of security requirements provided in this ST form a mutually supportive and internally consistent whole for the following reasons:

a) The choice of security requirements is justified as shown in Sections 8.3 and 8.4. The choice of SFRs and SARs is based on the assumptions about the objectives for, and the threats to, the TOE and the security environment. This ST provides evidence that the security objectives counter threats to the TOE, and that physical, personnel, and procedural assumptions are satisfied by security objectives for the TOE environment.

b) The security functions of the TOE satisfy the SFRs as shown in Table 12. All SFR and SAR dependencies have been satisfied or rationalized as shown in Table 14 and Table 15 and described in Section 8.6.

c) The SARs are appropriate for the assurance level of EAL2 and are satisfied by the TOE as shown in Table 13. EAL2 was chosen to provide a basic level of independently assured security with the assumption that products used in these environments will meet the security needs of the environment.

d) The SFRs and SARs presented in Section 5 and justified in Sections 8.3 and 8.4 are internally consistent. There is no conflict between security functions, as described in Section 2 and Section 6, and the SARs to prevent satisfaction of all SFRs.